

*United States Marine Corps  
School of Advanced Warfighting  
Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
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MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

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***TITLE:*** Changing the status quo: the Canadian Forces would be better postured to meet the current and future strategic requirements by replacing the conventional land forces (Army) with lightly equipped Special Operating Forces (SOF).

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**AUTHOR:** Lieutenant-Colonel Karl A.R. Michaud

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**Mentor:** Dr. Bradley J. Meyer

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## **PREFACE**

What a difference three years can make! In the past three years Canada: has purchased and used UAVs (the French made SPERWER) on operations; most of the “Clothe the Soldier” equipment has arrived in units; the much needed replacement of C130 Hercules aircraft has been announced; the purchase of heavy lift transport helicopters is out for contract; the desire to purchase amphibious shipping has been stated publicly; and the Joint Task Force II (JTF II) has been expanded sufficiently large enough to form the basis for a Special Operating Forces (SOF) structure. Despite “one-time” purchases for immediate operational requirements such as the UAVs for Operation ATHENA in Afghanistan, and heavy lift helicopters to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan, the Canadian Forces (CF) will not see any significant increase in spending over the next 15 years (at least) due to other fiscal pressures on the government, such as health care, the “baby-boomer” generation retiring, and tax reduction. Yet, given the recent purchases, announcements, and the strategic climate, the CF are at a crossroad; does the CF continue to produce and train conventional forces for operations, or does the CF truly transform to meet Canada’s unique strategic challenges. Three years ago, I would have said transforming the Army into SOF would be too cost prohibitive. Today, taking a fifteen-year outlook, I can envision a properly equipped, transformed Army coping with the strategic challenges of the future, having reached that end state within the confines of current fiscal realities.

This paper will examine whether the CF would be better poised to meet Canada’s current and future strategic requirements by replacing the conventional land forces (Army) with SOF. In so doing, the CF would take the projected vehicle overhead, maintenance and ammunition savings to purchase required SOF items such as attack aviation, as well as strategic air and sealift capacity, thereby making the newly-created SOF expeditionary in nature, while still maintaining capabilities for the defense of Canada.

In closing, I would be remiss if I didn’t especially thank my mentor, Dr. Bradley J. Meyer for his guidance and assistance throughout the development of this paper, and Dr. Wray R. Johnson for his insights covering this paper’s topic.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The Canadian government's historical fiscal and strategic Defense choices and current fiscal projections for the near term, the present-day and future threats to Canadian sovereignty, and the current Defense posture pose a unique challenge for the Canadian Forces (CF). This paper argues that the CF would be better postured to meet current and future strategic requirements while still meeting Canadian foreign policy objectives by replacing the conventional land forces (Army) with lightly equipped Special Operating Forces (SOF). Specifically, infantry, armored, engineer and artillery units located in each of the mechanized brigade groups would be re-rolled as twelve SOF battalions, four PSYOP battalions, four Civil Affairs battalions and four independent UAV batteries. Savings realized in overall strength for the Army in terms of number of personnel (represented by Person-Years (PYs)), should be reallocated in four areas: augmentation for the Army Schools in order to teach a SOF training curriculum; creation of four attack helicopter squadrons; creation of a strategic airlift squadron; and to crew four Landing Platform Helicopter Carriers. Money earned by selling Canada's armored and mechanized vehicles, in tandem with the projected vehicle overhead, infrastructure and maintenance savings, and the savings from large caliber ammunition such as Artillery and 25mm ammunition should be used to offset the purchase and maintenance costs for the Air Force and Navy. By converting the Army Regular Forces units into SOF, Canada would have a readily deployable force that was expeditionary in nature, viable as a future war-fighting force, viable as a future force for military operations other than war and better organized and equipped to fight the Global War on Terror. All this could be accomplished without compromising the defense of Canada.



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*-Abused, mismanaged, and neglected, with an active duty force of just over 50,000 in all services . . . backed by a miniscule reserve and sustained by barely one percent of the nation's Gross Domestic Product, Canada's military is hurtling toward what one senior serving officer has called a "mass extinction scenario".<sup>1</sup>*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The Canadian government's historical fiscal and strategic Defense choices and current fiscal projections for the near term, the present-day and future threats to Canadian sovereignty, and the current Defense posture pose a unique challenge for the Canadian Forces (CF).

Changing the status quo is no easy task, but in the eyes of many, it is absolutely essential to a sustainable future for the CF. This paper will argue that the CF would be better postured to meet current and future strategic requirements while still meeting Canadian foreign policy objectives by replacing the conventional land forces (Army) with lightly equipped Special Operating Forces (SOF). Specifically, Infantry, Armored, Engineer and Artillery units located in each of the mechanized brigade groups should be re-roled as twelve SOF battalions, four Psychological Operations (PSYOP) battalions, four Civil Affairs battalions and four independent Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) batteries. Savings realized in overall strength for the Army in terms of number of personnel (represented by Person-Years (PYs)), should be reallocated in four areas: augmentation for the Army Schools in order to teach a SOF training curriculum; creation of four attack helicopter squadrons; creation of a strategic airlift squadron; and to crew four Landing Platform Helicopter Carriers. Money earned by selling Canada's armored and mechanized vehicles (286 of the 424 are "new"), in tandem with the projected vehicle overhead, infrastructure and maintenance savings, and the savings from large caliber ammunition such as Artillery and 25mm ammunition, should be used to offset the purchase and maintenance costs for the new helicopters and ships.

As background information this paper will define the term SOF and will review the current CF organizations at the national and Army level. Subsequently, the paper will outline a number of key assumptions considered necessary to ensure that any proposed recommendations remain realistic. Next, the paper will explain why it is necessary to change the status quo from a conventional army to a SOF-based army. Next, in the analysis portion of this paper, a “Straw-man” construct for an Army composed of SOF in lieu of conventional forces will be introduced. Part of the analysis, which will be captured in three annexes, will include: a detailed, task-by-task analysis for existing Army responsibilities; an examination at the macro level of the required number of PYs necessary to people the new “Straw-man” organization; and a recommended implementation timeline. Finally, this paper will close with some specific recommendations regarding employment for each component of the Army (Regular and Reserve Force), how PYs should be reallocated, how the Army tasks should be assigned, and a recommended timeline for implementation.

## **BACKGROUND**

### **SOF**

For the purposes of this paper, SOF is defined as follows:

Special Operations Forces have a dual heritage . . . They are the nation's penetration and strike force, able to respond to specialized contingencies across the conflict spectrum with stealth, speed, and precision. They are also warrior-diplomats capable of influencing, advising, training, and conducting operations with foreign forces, officials, and populations. One of these two generic SOF roles is at the heart of each of the following special operations missions . . . Direct

Action . . . Special Reconnaissance . . . Unconventional Warfare . . . Foreign  
Internal Defense . . . Civil Affairs . . . Psychological Operations . . . Combatting  
Terrorism . . . Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction . . .  
Information Warfare (IW)/Command and Control Warfare (C2W) . . . [and]  
Collateral Activities . . . SOF's collateral activities are security assistance,  
counterdrug activities, countermine activities, humanitarian assistance, search and  
rescue/personnel recovery, special activities, and coalition support.<sup>2</sup>

## **Organization**

The CF has recently undergone a major realignment of its command and control (C2) structure, known as CF Transformation. Under CF Transformation, the three services (Army, Navy and Air Force) are not only aligned within a Joint Headquarters at the national level, but also at the regional level. Another major change involved the separation of strategic and operational level planning into two separate headquarters. The CF C2 structure is illustrated at Figure 1<sup>3</sup>. Since this paper proposes major organizational changes to the Army, the current Army structure is also illustrated (see Figure 2) as background information.

## **KEY ASSUMPTIONS**

A few years ago, the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS)<sup>4</sup> gave a speech to a group of officers, which has to a greater or lesser degree been reiterated since. In that speech, the CLS stated Army finances were seriously challenged even though the Army had received a one-time influx of money to purchase Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) and digital communications suites. The lesson learned was that even though the government eventually re-equips its armed forces when the need arises, without a permanent increase in the annual Defense budget there are insufficient funds for associated costs such as increased training<sup>5</sup>, and maintenance and housing<sup>6</sup> costs,

which sometimes exceed the original purchase price. Further, the interim report by the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence tabled in September 2005 stated that the Defense budget should be in the order of 25-35 billion dollars. Therefore, even with the much-touted influx of 12.8 billion dollars over the five years, the future annual budget of approximately 17.5 billion dollars will still fall far short of the required 25-35 billion dollars. Therefore, the first assumption is that given historical fiscal trends for Defense budgets, it is assumed that Defense spending will not experience any significant increases over the next 15 years, which will continue to limit the type and quantity of equipment and vehicles that the army can purchase and maintain.

The Conservative minority government elected in January 2006 has publicly stated that the CF will be authorized to increase its strength by 13,000 PYs. However, for the past decade, the CF has had recruiting and retention difficulties, which has left the CF with a trained effective strength of 51-55 thousand personnel vice the authorized level at just over 60,000 personnel. Therefore, there simply are not any “extra” PYs within the system and this fact will not change until there is a significant increase in recruiting and retention numbers. Further, given the scarcity of personnel, the Army Commander personally approves any reallocation of PYs within the Army and he must seek approval for additional PYs from the Chief of the Defence Staff. Accordingly, additional increases in PYs are difficult to obtain. Therefore, the second assumption is that any new organizational model must be relatively PY neutral.

Despite our participation in numerous United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations, two World Wars, Korea, and the first Gulf War, Canada has never employed its military unilaterally, except for the deployment of the

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). Consequently, the third assumption is that the CF will always fight or conduct operations as part of a coalition.


Canada, like most nations, uses its military to achieve foreign policy objectives. As such, the fourth assumption is that any land force must be capable of still providing a significant contribution within a coalition for operations or war, which is conducted conventionally or unconventionally.<sup>7</sup>

Fifth, it is assumed that the CF as a whole must remain capable of defending Canada, which includes providing the necessary (though possibly different) commitments to NORAD and the NATO.

Sixth, it is assumed that the CF must still be able to respond to Aid of the Civil Power and to civil emergency type situations.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, since budget considerations are one of the driving factors behind the concepts presented in this paper, this paper offers a seventh assumption that existing infrastructure will be used. Thus, the costs of relocating forces and building new infrastructure and bases would be negated. It should be noted however that this assumption does not exclude costs associated with renovations to existing infrastructure should they be required.


**Figure 1: CF Transformation - Phase II C2 Structure (1 Feb 06)**



**Note 1:** Special Operations Group is a force generation formation, exercising command for employment only on special occasions.

**Note 2:** Regional Formations will command and control all tri-service lower formations and units such as brigades located within those respective regions. The Regional Formations will be Northern Area (North West Territory Yukon Territory, and Nunavut), Pacific Area (British Columbia), Prairie Area (Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba), Central Area (Ontario), Eastern Area (Quebec), and Atlantic Area (Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island).

**Figure 2: Army Force Structure – Generic (Note 1)**



**Notes:**

**Note 1:** This is the generic structure as the quantity of Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups (CMBGs) and Canadian Brigade Groups (CBGs) varies between each Joint Region. There is one CMBG in the Prairie, Central and Eastern Regions. There are neither CMBGs nor CBGs in the Northern Area. There is one CBG in the Pacific Region, two CBGs in the Prairie, Eastern and Atlantic Regions, and three CBGs in the Central Region. A Mechanized Infantry Battalion, an Air Defense Regiment and an Engineer Support Regiment are the only Regular Force Units present in Land Forces Atlantic Area. There are no Regular Force units in the Pacific Region.

**Note 2:** By 2007, all Air Defense assets will be centralized under the Prairie Region for use at the Canadian Maneuver Training Center in Wainwright, Alberta.

**Note 3:** Under Army Support Review and under the Interim Army concept as part of Army Transformation, the Field Ambulances and Service Battalions will remain in location and will be TACON or OPCON to the brigades for exercises and operations as required; but they will remain under command of central Joint organizations at the national level (as an example all medical assets will remain under command of the Canadian Forces Medical Group).



## **RATIONALE FOR A SOF-BASED ARMY**

### **Defense Planning Guidance**

There are two key documents that provide the basis for the Department of National Defence's planning guidance – the *White Paper on Defence* and *Canada's International Policy Statement*. Canada's 1994 *White Paper on Defence* calls upon the CF to train and equip personnel in order to fight in a mid-intensity conflict. On the other hand, *Canada's International Policy Statement 2005* states that the focus for Canadian foreign policy involves countering terrorism, stabilizing failed and fragile states, and combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Options to address the dichotomy between the *White Paper on Defence* and *Canada's International Policy Statement* will be presented later under the heading Ends, Ways and Means.

### **Tactical Resources - Shortfalls**

In order to fight in a mid-intensity conflict, the CF requires the necessary equipment, vehicles, and tactical aircraft. Owing to budget shortfalls, Defense spending has failed to modernize the CF in areas necessary to fight in a mid-intensity conflict. Two noticeable equipment shortfalls are tanks and attack aviation.<sup>9</sup> Arguably, tanks and attack aviation are essential components of the combined arms team and are required for success on the modern battlefield.

### **Strategic Resources - Shortfalls**

Barring a mid-intensity conflict against the United States, clearly one implied task from the 1994 *White Paper on Defence* is that the CF needs strategic air and sealift capacity to transport its mechanized forces outside of North America in a timely manner. Currently, the CF lacks strategic lift as evidenced when the CF relied on the rental of *Antonov An-70* aircraft to

deploy the 200-person DART<sup>10</sup>. Recent governmental press releases announced that Canada would be purchasing new transport aircraft. However, rather than replacing the aging C-130 Hercules fleet with a combination of C-130 Hercules, and C-141 Starlifter, C-5 Galaxy, or C-17 Globe-master size aircraft, Canada has elected to purchase nothing but C-130 Hercules size aircraft, with the front-runner being a C-130J. Although this solves the problem of maintaining 40-plus-year-old aircraft, it does not improve Canada's strategic airlift capabilities. Further exacerbating Canada's strategic lift problem is that the CF does not own any roll-on/roll-off ships or Landing Platform Helicopter Carrier type ships. All large pieces of equipment and vehicles must be transported via commercial shipping for traditional operations. Although the Navy recently announced a desire to purchase amphibious shipping once the aging fleet support vessels were replaced in five to seven years, the Navy also stated that they were unsure as to how they would fund the purchase of amphibious ships.

### **Ends, Ways and Means**

Clearly, there is a schism between ends, ways and means – the CF lacks the resources to accomplish the tasks defined in the *White Paper on Defence*. Given assumption one stated earlier (Defense spending will not experience any significant increases over the next 15 years, which will continue to limit the type and quantity of equipment and vehicles that the army can purchase and maintain), the CF will continue to lack the necessary equipment, vehicles, ships and aircraft to deploy to and then fight in a mid-intensity conflict. Given the first assumption, the Canadian government has two main options to harmonize the ends, ways and means: Option 1 - modify the 1994 *White Paper on Defence* to replace the clause about fighting in a mid-intensity conflict with “Canada will only provide Naval and Air Forces to a mid-intensity conflict” and realign the Army's assigned tasks with the priorities stated in *Canada's*

*International Policy Statement 2005*; or Option 2 - change the status quo and examine whether the CF would be better poised to meet the current and future strategic requirements by replacing the conventional land forces with lightly equipped SOF.

### **Option 1**

Under Option 1 the CF would still provide ships, submarines and air forces for a mid-intensity conflict. Further, the CF would still be capable of deploying conventional ground forces in support of countering terrorism and stabilizing failed and fragile states type missions. Although Canada's Defense budget would still require an increase to maintain the current force structure, the increase would be significantly less than required to augment the Army to fight in a mid-intensity conflict. Clearly, Canada would still be able to meet her Defense related foreign policy objectives as stated in *Canada's International Policy Statement 2005* but arguably Canada would lose clout with her various Allies which might impede other Foreign policy goals. Therefore, although Option 1 is feasible, it may not, under closer scrutiny be acceptable to the Canadian Government.

### **Option 2**

**General.** Option 2 entails the restructuring of the Army into twelve SOF battalions, four PSYOP battalions, four Civil Affairs battalions and four independent UAV batteries. Further, four attack helicopter squadrons, a strategic airlift squadron, and four Landing Platform Helicopter Carriers would be added to the Air Force and Navy.

**Conventional War Employment.** SOF are best employed in the Special Reconnaissance role during a conventional war. In addition, the Civil Affairs battalions, PSYOP battalions, UAV batteries, and Nuclear-Biological-Chemical and Radiological platoons would prove useful in any coalition for conventional warfare, filling a special niche traditionally under-

manned.

**Combating Terrorism/Foreign Internal Defense (FID).** Arguably, the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) cannot be won using conventional forces or SOF. However, one aspect of the GWOT is that some organization with the ability to locate, then kill or capture terrorists is required. SOF by their nature and training have thus far been given the lead for the GWOT. Further, many of Canada's allies, including the United States conducts FID in those regions of the globe that are potential "breeding grounds" for terrorists. Traditionally, most of the FID tasks involve training failed or failing nations' forces on basic combat and soldier skills. Clearly, either conventional or SOF could be assigned a FID task, however, SOF teams are better able to deploy and work independently, thereby reducing the signature on the ground and increasing the number of locations that can be covered. Therefore, if Canada were to convert its Army into SOF, Canada would have a significant force for employment in the GWOT, which could be employed at home or abroad.

**Employment for UN and NATO "Peacekeeping" Type Operations.** Canada prides itself on its participation in numerous UN and NATO "Peacekeeping" type missions. Conventional forces are rarely in short supply for these missions unlike niche capabilities such as Special Reconnaissance, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, FID, and Counter-terrorism type forces. For example, Canada's two main current missions with NATO and US Forces in Afghanistan are the provision of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (Civil Affairs unit); and the locating and killing or capturing of terrorists. Prior to these missions, one of Canada's missions involved assisting US forces in FID of Afghani military units. Arguably, there will be an ever-increasing demand for Canada and her allies for SOF for the foreseeable future.

## **Option 1 vs Option 2**

Option 1 and 2 both allow Canada to meet her Defense related foreign policy objectives as stated in *Canada's International Policy Statement 2005*, although Option 2 is better suited for the task of combating terrorism. It is likely that Option 1 will negatively impact other Foreign Policy objectives as it will be seen by Canada's allies that Canada is not participating fully in all of her Defense commitments. Option 2 allows Canada to participate as a significant and useful partner in a conventional war scenario, in the GWOT and as part of a UN or NATO "Peacekeeping" type operation. Having addressed why replacing Canada's conventional land forces with SOF is the preferred option, this paper will next focus on the appropriate structure and how to achieve that structure for the Canadian Army.

## **STRUCTURE ANALYSIS**

### **General**

A "Straw-man" model will be used to show how Canada's Army could be transformed into SOF without violating any of the stated assumptions. For the "Straw-man" model there are some aspects of the current Army structure that will remain the same with little or no modification, specifically: Military Police (MPs); Medical; Service Support; Signals; Air Defense; and Intelligence. Each of these organizations will be examined to identify what changes, if any are required under the "Straw-man" model. Next, the analysis will focus on those units (combat arms units<sup>11</sup>), which will undergo the greatest transformation.

### **MPs**

MPs are already a tri-service military occupation classification. Garrison police functions such as traffic and investigations would still be required for Army installations. For SOF employment, MPs would no longer be required to learn and practice movement control for Army

formations, instead they would shift their focus to Counter-Intelligence operations, prisoner interrogation, and operating prisoner detention facilities on deployed operations.

## **Medical**

Little change, if any would be required to the medical units. The CF would still command all medical resources centrally. Further, the CF would still require the medical community to provide deployable medical services and hospitals for SOF operations and for the DART. Given the medical services and hospitals would be in support of the SOF, it is reasonable that Army medical units would still be affiliated with whatever Army organization they support.

## **Service Support**

Service Support entails transportation, supply, maintenance, postal, laundry and bath, and financial services. Army Service Support organizations would remain essentially the same, but would see a reduction in overall numbers, vehicles, equipment and infrastructure. Conceivably, fewer Supply Technicians and especially the infrastructure to house spare parts would be required if the mechanized portion of the Army was transformed into SOF. The same argument can be made for a significant reduction in Vehicle Technicians and infrastructure for maintenance facilities. Transport services would remain static unless there was a requirement to move all SOF at the same time. Given that mechanized vehicles are integral for combat arms units, transforming mechanized units into SOF would lead to an increase in transportation requests.

## **Signals**

The Signals Branch is responsible for the personnel, vehicles and equipment necessary for units and formations to communicate and process information within their organization and higher formations. The war fighting, UN and NATO operations and the GWOT still require some form of headquarters that can conduct data fusion from a plethora of intelligence platforms and

sources. Moreover, SOF will require various levels of headquarters to control and plan operations, which will in turn require communications suites to exercise command and control. Therefore, little change is envisioned for the Signals units.

### **Air Defense**

Although Air Defense will still be required to protect deployed headquarters and airfields, it will no longer be required to protect large mechanized formations. As such, mobile air defense assets can be replaced with cheaper, static systems once they are due for replacement.

### **Intelligence**

The CF has already recognized and is starting to address the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) for not only the GWOT, but also but the evolving stabilization missions in regions with failed or failing states. Therefore, the future training and structure for Intelligence personnel and units should not require significant alteration from that already envisioned.

### **Combat Arms Units**

Although SOF will need all of the military occupation classifications listed above, and although SOF teams will require a Signals and a Medical expert, the bulk of the SOF teams and units will be comprised of current combat arms personnel. All members of SOF teams have common specialized training. Usually, one or two members possess some other form of uniquely specialized training such as demolitions. Initially, under the proposed “Straw-man” model, personnel with existing uniquely specialized training in areas such as medical, communications, explosives and demolitions would fill this void, and would only require the common specialized training. Eventually, these unique qualifications would come from team members who receive specialized training.

## **“Straw-Man” Organizational Chart**


Figure 3 illustrates the “Straw-man” model for the Canadian Army as SOF. Its basic structure was modeled after the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) organizations and adapted for other realities such as Canadian participation in UN operations.

## **“Straw-man” Manning Sources**

Annex A examines PY increase/losses by unit in changing infantry battalions into SOF battalions, Armored Regiments<sup>12</sup> into PSYOP battalions, Combat Engineer Regiments into Civil Affairs battalions and Artillery Regiments into independent UAV batteries. Furthermore, Canada currently uses a rotation model based on the “rule of three”: one unit deployed; one unit returned from deployment and in the process of reconstitution; and one unit training for deployment. In reality, the reconstituted unit is utilized to train, support tasks and place its personnel on individual qualification courses, thus never really reconstituting. The Army does not employ a “rule of four” model (optimum) because it lacks the units to implement such a system. Since SOF units for the most part are smaller than conventional units, more SOF units can be created so that rotation models can now be based on four versus three units. If a rotational model based on four is used, then there are 2,133 PYs available for reallocation. It is estimated that one hundred PYs will be required to expand the Army Schools since SOF training is normally more manpower intensive than conventional training. Also, it is estimated that four squadrons of attack helicopters<sup>13</sup> would require 800 PYs total. In addition, to standup a strategic air squadron (employing four C-5 Galaxy size aircraft) would require an additional 100 PYs. Finally, to man four Landing Platform Helicopter Carriers (similar to HMS Ocean L12 class ship) requires an additional 1,136 PYs total.



**Figure 3: “Straw-man” Model**



## **STRUCTURE ANALYSIS (Continued)**

### **Regular or Reserve Forces?**

Significant change is not readily accepted by established organizations such as the CF. Replacing conventional forces with SOF will cause great concern and angst both from within and outside of the CF. Therefore, it is likely that the CF and the Canadian Government will want to proceed somewhat cautiously and will therefore only support a reorganization of either the Regular Forces or the Reserve Forces to SOF, but not both.

There are several advantages to converting the Regular Forces to SOF instead of the Reserve Forces. To have a readily deployable strategic asset such as SOF requires highly trained units that can be deployed within a short period of time. Reserve Force personnel only train two nights a week, one to two weekends per month, and for up to two months during the summer period. Arguably, this does not provide enough time for Reservists to attain and maintain the skill set required to man the SOF battalions. Second, unlike the United States, Canada does not have any job protection legislation for its Reservists. As such, Reservists can only be forced to deploy in the event that there is a declaration of war from Parliament. Reservists are under no obligation to deploy on operations or for a “vague war” such as the GWOT. The main disadvantage with using the Regular Forces for SOF and the Reserve Forces for conventional forces is that should Canada wish to deploy conventional forces for an operation, it will be limited by the scope of training and the willingness of Reservists to deploy. If the CF and the Canadian Government make the decision to eliminate conventional forces entirely, then the Reserve Forces would best be employed as Civil Affairs and PSYOP augmentation personnel or sub-units.

## **Army Task Analysis**

The tasks defined in the *Strategic Operations and Resource Direction 2005 Draft 1* (this is the document which outlines all of the CF's tasks both foreign and domestic) is analyzed in Annex B of this paper. The gist of the analysis is that the new SOF units created for the "Straw-man" model are capable of performing all of the previously assigned tasks with a few noted exceptions. Under the "Straw-man" model, Canada would have to renegotiate various commitments to NATO, the United States and the UN. Given the nature of Canada's current commitment to these organizations, realigning these commitments for SOF type missions would likely enhance the various missions. At first glance, another shortfall for the "Straw-man" model is that the Pacific Region would not have an Immediate Response Unit (IRU) at their disposal for various domestic tasks. However, under the current system the Pacific Region still does not have a dedicated IRU and relies on the IRU from the Prairie Region (closest Region with Regular Force units), hence the "Straw-man" model is task neutral in comparison to the status quo.

## **Implementation Timeline**

Annex C examines one possible solution on the macro level for an implementation timeline. In examining a timeline, two aspects were analyzed – individuals and units. Essentially, Joint Task Force II (JTF II) personnel would be used as the nucleus for training personnel and the new organizations. Individuals would be retrained, as necessary based on aptitude for SOF and time remaining before compulsory retirement age. Training, equipping and standing-up new organizations would be a phased approach over the next 15 years.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **General**

The evidence and analysis suggest that the “Straw-man” model (illustrated in Figure 3) be adopted in lieu of the Army model currently in use. Further, the “Straw-man” model should be based on a rotational model of four. Therefore, in addition to the four SOF battalions per Regional Special Operations Command (for a total of twelve), a total of four PSYOP battalions, four Civil Affairs battalions, and four independent UAV batteries should be formed.

### **Person-Year Reallocations**

The author recommends 100 PYs be transferred to the Army Battle Schools to offset the increased number of PYs required to change the curriculum to a SOF based training curriculum. Further, the author recommends of the remaining 2,133 PYs available for reallocation once the Army is transformed into SOF, 900 PYs are transferred to the Air Force to form four attack helicopter squadrons and one strategic air lift squadron, and 1,136 PYs are transferred to the Navy to man four Landing Platform Helicopter Carriers (similar to an HMS Ocean L12 class ship).

### **Regular – Reserve Force Employment**

The Regular Force should be transformed into SOF and assume the responsibilities for all SOF training and employment. The Reserve Force should continue to train and equip conventional forces. Should the Government of Canada deem that conventional forces are no longer required then the Reserve Force should then be given the responsibility to train and generate Civil Affairs and PSYOP trained personnel and sub-units.

## **Army Task Assignment**

The tasks defined in the *Strategic Operations and Resource Direction 2005 Draft 1* should be distributed as outlined in the Army Task Analysis annex of this paper (see Annex B).

## **Implementation Timeline**

The timeline specified in Annex C should be adopted – specifically, to sequentially phase in over a 15 year period the following: emplace training support infrastructure; re-role the light infantry units to SOF, followed by the mechanized infantry battalions in groups of three; concurrently, with each group of three, re-role one armored and one combat engineer regiment to PSYOP and Civil Affairs battalions respectively; form two independent UAV batteries out of the first artillery regiment then re-role the remaining two UAV batteries in conjunction with the mechanized infantry battalions; expand the formed units to finally achieve the desired end state for number of formed units; finally, deployed operational tasks for mechanized battalions are changed to SOF battalion tasks to conform to the first two groups of three SOF battalions being declared operational.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Transforming the Regular Forces of the Canadian Army into a SOF army best meets the current and future threats to Canadian sovereignty, given the military's current fiscal projections for the near term and the current Defense posture. Ideally, Canada would have a large deployable conventional force augmented by substantial SOF, but this is not, nor likely to be achievable in the near future. The SOF army would re-role the Infantry, Armored, Engineer and Artillery units located in each of the mechanized brigade groups as twelve SOF battalions, four

PSYOP battalions, four Civil Affairs battalions and four independent UAV batteries. Further, four attack helicopter squadrons, a strategic airlift squadron, and four Landing Platform Helicopter Carriers would be acquired by selling Canada's armored and mechanized vehicles, in tandem with the projected vehicle overhead, infrastructure and maintenance savings, and the savings from large caliber ammunition such as Artillery and 25mm ammunition. By converting the Army Regular Forces units into SOF, Canada would have a readily deployable force that is expeditionary in nature, viable as a future war-fighting force, viable as a future force for military operations other than war and better organized and equipped to fight the GWOT. All this could be accomplished without compromising the defense of Canada.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Bacevich, Dr. Andrew J., Review of Who Killed the Canadian Military? By J.L. Granastein, Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2004 as published in Parameters US Army Quarterly, Vol. XXXV, No 3, Autumn 2005, page 149.

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr96/chap\\_22.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr96/chap_22.html) downloaded from the Internet on 13 February 2006.

<sup>3</sup> Diagram taken from a PowerPoint presentation given by Major-General WJ Natynczyk, Chief of CF Transformation to the Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (Washington) in October 2005. Additional notes have been added and abbreviations have been spelled out for clarification.

<sup>4</sup> The Chief of the Land Staff is the term used for what would be commonly known as the Army Commander.

<sup>5</sup> When new equipment is introduced which requires significantly more training than its predecessor due to the technological nature, the delta for training and the money to conduct that training represent an annual increased requirement. Previously using the M113's, only the driver received training. With the Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), not only is the amount of driver training increased, but the crew commander and gunner must now undergo extensive training. The new suite of digital communications (ATHENA) not only requires more additional training time, but requires continual refresher training due to its complex nature.

<sup>6</sup> Another annual increase, which is often unaccounted for, is the delta to maintain and in some cases house new pieces of equipment and vehicles. Life expectancy for the LAVs was based on each of the LAVs being parked inside a heated facility when not in use. The traditional method was to park vehicles outside with a tarp when not in use. Hence, the Army has to either build new facilities to house the LAVs or be prepared to purchase a replacement fleet sooner than planned.

<sup>7</sup> Unconventional warfare is used to express what is now commonly referred to as Fourth Generation Warfare.

<sup>8</sup> Canadian Provincial Governments have no military forces under their control. Under Canadian Law, the Provinces petition the Federal Government for military assistance for Aid of the Civil Power (such as the OKA disturbance involving Native Canadians and the Quebec Provincial Government) and civil emergencies (such as the Winnipeg Floods or the Ontario/Quebec Ice Storm). When authorized, the Canadian Government orders the Chief of the Defence Staff to provide assistance. It is then up to the Chief of the Defence Staff to decide in what form the military response will be. As an example, the Chief of the Defence Staff may decide to send one soldier or the entire Canadian Forces.

<sup>9</sup> The antiquated Leopard I tanks are being phased out over the next couple of years to be replaced by a 105mm STRYKER variant. The STRYKER is not a tank, nor designed to fight as a tank. Further, by phasing out the Leopard chassis, the Engineers will lose the platform for the Armored Engineer Vehicle (AEV) and the Armored Vehicle Layer Bridge (AVLB), which will greatly impact the Army's mobility and counter-mobility required to fight in a mid-intensity conflict. The CF has Griffon helicopters (an unarmed, light utility helicopter) and will be purchasing 16 Chinook helicopters for troop transport with delivery expected in three to five years. The CF does not employ any armed variant of helicopter.

<sup>10</sup> The DART rents Antonov aircraft since the CF's C-130 Hercules aircraft are too small for the task even though the DART does not employ equipment or vehicles in large quantity, size or weight when compared to a conventional mechanized force of the same size (say a square combat team). In Canadian doctrine a square combat team consists of a rifle company and a tank squadron. Combat teams are employed within a battle group concept (Infantry battalion with a tank squadron (s) or an armored regiment with an infantry company (s) and usually includes artillery observation teams and an engineer close support troop.

<sup>11</sup> Within the Canadian Army, Infantry, Armored, Artillery and Engineers are considered to be combat arms MOCs and units.

<sup>12</sup> In Canada, Armored, Artillery and Engineer Regiments are battalion size.

<sup>13</sup> In Canada, everything that flies less tactical UAVs belong to the Air Force.

<sup>14</sup> *Strategic Operations and Resource Direction 2005 Draft 1* page 3-1A-8/17. The SORD is an Army level document provided to subordinate formations.

<sup>15</sup> The four requirements for the task of Command Forces are found in the remarks column of the *Strategic Operations and Resource Direction 2005 Draft 1* and are assigned to Land Forces Western Area, Land Forces Central Area, Secteur Quebec Forces de Terre and Land Forces Atlantic Area on pages 3-1A-B1-1/16, 3-1A-B2-1/17, 3-1A-B3-1/13, and 3-1A-B4-1/12 respectively.

<sup>16</sup> A combat arms sub-unit is a company size element of approximately 100-120 personnel all ranks.

<sup>17</sup> *Strategic Operations and Resource Direction 2005 Draft 1*. Assigned to Land Forces Western Area, Land Forces Central Area, Secteur Quebec Forces de Terre and Land Forces Atlantic Area on pages 3-1A-B1-2/16, 3-1A-B2-1/17, 3-1A-B3-1/13, and 3-1A-B4-2/12 respectively.

<sup>18</sup> *Strategic Operations and Resource Direction 2005 Draft 1*. Assigned to Land Forces Western Area, Land Forces Central Area, Secteur Quebec Forces de Terre and Land Forces Atlantic Area on pages 3-1A-B1-2/16, 3-1A-B2-2/17, 3-1A-B3-2/13, and 3-1A-B4-2/12 respectively.

<sup>19</sup> Currently, all combat divers in the CF are combat engineers located in the three Combat Engineer Regiments, 4 Engineer Support Regiment, and at the Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering.



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### WOUNDED

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## ANNEX A – PERSON-YEAR (PY) ANALYSIS

<b>Current Organization</b>	<b># of Existing PYs</b> <sup>Note 1</sup>	<b>Future Organization</b> <sup>Note 2</sup>	<b>Required # of PYs</b>	<b>Delta to System (+/-)</b>
3 x Light Infantry Battalions	3x644 = 1932	12 x SOF Battalions <sup>Note 3</sup>	12x383 = 4596	+ 1410
6 x Mechanized Infantry Battalions	6x679 = 4074			
3 x Armored Regiments	3 x 495 = 1485	4 x PSYOP Battalions <sup>Note 4</sup>	4x200 = 800	+ 685
3 x Artillery Regiments	3 x 456 = 1368	4 x UAV Batteries <sup>Note 5</sup>	4x200 = 800	+568
3 x Combat Engineer Regiments	3 x 390 = 1170	4 x Civil Affairs Battalions <sup>Note 6</sup>	4x400 = 1600	- 430
Remaining Mechanized Brigade Units	-	Unchanged, except for loss of mechanized vehicles and some supply and vehicle technicians.	-	-
Orphan Units (2 EW Sqn, 4 AD Regt, 4 ESR)	-	Unchanged, except for loss of mechanized vehicles and some supply and vehicle technicians	-	-
Affected Schools (Infantry, Armored, Artillery and Engineer)	400	SOF School to include PSYOP and Civil Affairs. Infantry, and Armored Schools for Reserve standardization. Artillery School for Reserve standardization and UAV training. Engineer School – no change.	500	- 100
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF PYs SAVED</b>				<b>+ 2,133</b> <sup>Note 7</sup>

New Organization	Estimated # of PYs Required
4 x Attack Helicopter Squadrons	4 x 200 = 800
1 x Strategic Airlift Squadron (5 x C5 Galaxy type aircraft)	1 x 100 = 100
4 x Amphibious Assault Helicopter Ship (ie. HMS Ocean L12 class – Landing Platform Helicopter Carrier)	4 x 284 = 1136
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF PYs REQUIRED FOR “STRAW-MAN” MODEL</b>	2,036 (with 2,133 available, there is a delta of + 97 PYs)

**Notes:**

**Note 1:** Since this chart deals with PYs, unit established strengths were used. In reality, all units are under strength, either owing to recruiting/retention issues for a particular Military Occupation Classification (MOC) or because positions are on loan to other organizations.

**Note 2:** Currently Canada uses a rotation model based on three: one unit deployed, one unit returned from deployment and in the process of reconstitution; and one unit training for deployment. In reality, the unit that is reconstituting is being used for training support tasks and getting their personnel qualification courses, hence that unit never really reconstitutes. Since SOF units for the most part are smaller than the conventional units, three choices are available: reallocate/save all of the PYs, create larger SOF units; or create more SOF units so that rotation models will now be based on four vice three units. Since the latter is recommended, figures for a rotation model of four will be used for the calculations.

**Note 3:** Required # of PYs based on the U.S. Army Special Forces Battalion strength.

**Note 4:** Required # of PYs based on a PSYOP battalion strength belonging to the U.S. Army 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group.

**Note 5:** Required # of PYs based on Canadian UAV Battery deployed to Afghanistan for Operation ATHENA, plus a headquarters and support element factored in as this will be an independent unit of battery strength.

**Note 6:** Required # of PYs based on the U.S. Army 96<sup>th</sup> Civil Affairs Battalion (CA Bn) strength. The 96<sup>th</sup> CA Bn has a headquarters company and five CA companies to deal with the various Combatant Commands. The Canadian CA Bn would only have a headquarters element, a support company and three CA companies.

**Note 7:** There are 2,133 PYs available for creation of other units necessary to support the “Straw-man” model, such as attack aviation squadrons, strategic air squadron, and amphibious/flat-top ships.

## **ANNEX B – STRATEGIC TASK ANALYSIS**

### **GENERAL**

In the main body of the paper various assumptions indicate that there cannot be an overall reduction in capabilities or the ability to carry out assigned tasks. This analysis will examine the assigned operational tasks, training tasks, national and international training tasks, simulation training tasks, and miscellaneous tasks assigned to the Army as specified in the *Strategic Operations and Resource Direction 2005 Draft 1*.<sup>14</sup> Many of these tasks were assigned to the various Land Force Area Headquarters (HQs) (Regionally based Army HQs which did not include Northern Area, and which previously had amalgamated Pacific and Prairie regions into Western Area). It is assumed that the bulk of the tasks, which originally went to the Land Force Area HQs, will be transferred to the Joint Regional HQs under CF Transformation. Specifically for this analysis, each task will be listed sequentially to include which organization currently fulfills each of the tasks and which organization should fulfill the tasks if the Regular Forces of the Army were transformed into SOF as depicted in the “Straw-man” model (Figure 3).

### **OPERATIONAL TASKS**

#### **Command Forces – DT1-63**

The requirements of this task are four-fold: each HQ must be able to command and control forces in the conduct of assigned missions; the missions can be either for domestic or international operations; each HQ is be capable of supporting DT2-3-91 (The plan for Humanitarian Assistance within Canada), DT2-4-

100 (The plan for Aid of the Civil Power) and DT2-6-114 (The plan for Assistance to Other Governmental Departments); and the missions will require liaison with the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), the Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS), Canadian Forces National Authority (CFNA), and potentially each HQ will be required to provide augmentees to the Canadian Forces Joint Forces HQ (CFJHQ).<sup>15</sup> Under the “Straw-man” model, this task would be reassigned to each of the Joint Regional HQs.

#### **Surveillance and Control – DT2-1-75**

The task of Surveillance and Control used to be assigned to all of the Land Forces Areas. With CF Transformation, this task will be assigned to the Joint Regional HQs. The task entails a combat-arms sub-unit<sup>16</sup> conducting a sovereignty operation in the Arctic with the Canadian Ranger Patrols. Under the “Straw-man” model, the Special Forces Battalions or Reserve Force units located within the Canadian Brigade Groups within each respective Region would be given the task to ensure that the same number of sub-units continue to conduct sovereignty operations in the Arctic.

#### **Search and Rescue (Generic) – DT2-2-84**

Each Area HQ was required to provide “one immediate response unit (IRU). . . . [to] provide the capability to respond to ground search and rescue incidents.”<sup>17</sup> This task will be reassigned to each Joint Regional HQ. The response time for the Search and Rescue task is eight hours, therefore, this task is usually assigned to Regular Force units. Hence, it is likely the SOF battalions will fill this task. Under the current model, one IRU was provided for what is now

Pacific and Prairie Region. Given Assumption #7 from the main body of this paper — no new infrastructure — together with the fact are no Regular Force Army troops in Pacific Region, the IRU will have to be provided by Air Force or Navy personnel (not ideal owing to their ground mobility and communications limitations), or continue to use the IRU from Prairie Region.

#### **Search and Rescue - Major Air Disaster (MAJAID) – DT2-2-84**

The MAJAID task exists to ensure that when a large number of casualties occur in a region with limited or non-existent medical assets, Canada has some form of response to deal with the situation. The Canadian Forces Medical Group is tasked to provide a Medical Support Company at four hours notice, and under the proposed model this would continue. Assuming that the Canadian Forces Medical Group continues to use 2 Field Ambulance in Petawawa, Ontario to provide the Medical Support Company, then the Central Region HQ would be assigned the task to provide security for the medical company.

#### **Humanitarian Assistance in Canada – DT2-3-91 (Canada)**

This task entails an Immediate Response Unit (IRU) at 24 hours notice plus additional assets as required for each Land Force Area HQ. In the *Strategic Operations and Resource Direction 2005 Draft 1*, it states the “force structure is task dependent [and] may reqr [require] In [liaison] with other Gov’t [Governmental] agencies”.<sup>18</sup> Given the short notice response time, Regular Force Units conduct this task in each of the Areas, hence under the “Straw-man” model, this task would be assigned to each Joint Regional HQ. Similar to the caveats for Search and Rescue (Generic) – DT2-2-84, the IRU for Pacific Region would have

to come from either the Air Force or Navy, or continue to use the IRU from Prairie Region. Historically, for Humanitarian Assistance missions in Canada the IRU is simply the first unit to be mobilized, with the bulk of the Regular and Reserve Forces be mobilized as soon as possible. Recent examples include the Winnipeg Flood and the Ontario/Quebec Ice Storms.

#### **International Humanitarian Assistance (DART) – DT2-3-91 (INTL)**

The DART Company was tasked to Central Area because of its proximity to the air base at Trenton Ontario, because most of the DART equipment is stored at Trenton and because the DART HQ is located at the nearby Canadian Forces Joint HQ (soon to form the nucleus of Canadian Expeditionary Command HQ – see Figure 1) in Kingston, Ontario. Under the “Straw-man” model, the DART Company task would be transferred to the Joint HQ in Central Region. The DART Company comprises a medical platoon, a logistics platoon, an engineer troop and a security platoon to company size formation. All of these organizations would still be present in Petawawa under the new model except for the engineer troop. Therefore, the engineer troop would either have to come from Air Force Engineers located at Trenton, Ontario or from 4 Engineer Support Regiment (ESR) in Gagetown, New Brunswick (as per Note 2 of Figure 3, 4 ESR remains as an engineer regiment under central control).

#### **Aid of the Civil Power<sup>8</sup> – DT2-4-100**

The Aid of the Civil Power task resembles the Humanitarian Assistance in Canada task, except that deployment timelines for the IRU vary. The Joint Regional HQs would fulfill this task in a similar fashion to Search and Rescue

(Generic) – DT2-2-84 task and the Humanitarian Assistance in Canada – DT2-3-91 (Canada) task. The Aid of the Civil Power task includes annual reconnaissance and plans updates for likely situations such as prison riots. The Joint Regional HQs would be tasked to ensure that in conjunction with the IRUs, reconnaissance and plans updates continued.

**Evacuation of Canadians – DT2-5-107 (NEO).**

The Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) task rotates among the Land Forces Areas. Under the “Straw-man” model, the NEO task would rotate among Prairie, Central, Eastern and Atlantic Regions since these Regions would have the SOF battalions.

**Assistance to Other Governmental Departments – DT2-6-114**

This task deals with everything except Humanitarian Assistance and Aid of the Civil Power. For the “Straw-man” construct this task would be assigned to each Joint Regional HQ.

**Provide a Battalion Group to UNSAS/SHIRBRIG – DT2-7-132**

This task entails a mechanized battalion for deployment overseas. Under the “Straw-man” model, Canada no longer possesses a mechanized battalion. Hence, this task would have to be renegotiated with Canada’s allies. For most of the international tasks, what Canada brings to the mission is often less important than Canada’s participation as a show of solidarity among the allies (ie. Wave the flag). Two options exist for this task: transfer the task to another country; or transfer the task to another country and Canada assumes some other task more in line with the capabilities that will exist under the “Straw-man” model. In addition



to the battalion group, Canada provides an electronic warfare element, which for the “Straw-man” model would simply continue with 2 Electronic Warfare Squadron (EW Sqn) for execution (as per Note 2 of Figure 3, 2 EW Sqn remains under central control).

#### **Provide a Brigade HQ to UNSAS – DT2-7-132**

Under the “Straw-man” model, the Regional Special Operations Command HQs (which use the CMBG HQs as the nucleus) located in Prairie, Central and Eastern Regions would be capable of fulfilling this role. However, once the “Straw-man” model is in effect, less attention and training will be spent on conventional operations, hence the Special Operations Command HQs would not be well trained in controlling multiple conventional units for a conventional war. Note that there is no requirement to provide the Brigade HQ to SHIRBRIG - the Standing High Readiness Brigade.

#### **Provide a Signals Squadron to UNSAS – DT2-7-132**

The affiliated Signals Squadron to the tasked Regional Special Operations Command HQ would assume this task under the “Straw-man” model.

#### **Defense of North America (CANUS Brigade) – DT2-8-139**

This task entails each Land Forces Area providing an initial response, based on their respective IRUs, followed by the mobilization of at least one brigade. Given the current and projected threats to the North America – terrorist activity, it would not be too difficult to convince the United States that a brigade-sized SOF formation would be more gainfully employed than a conventionally equipped and trained brigade. In the unlikely event that North America is invaded, it is unlikely

that Canada's three mechanized brigades, or lack thereof will "tip the scales".

Further, the SOF created under the "Straw-man" model could be used as the nucleus for guerilla warfare against the invading force.

#### **International Security – DT2-9-153 (NATO Response Force)**

For this task, Canada enters the NATO rotation cycle, distributing the NATO Response Force task among the Land Forces Areas. Similar to the Battalion Group to UNSAS/SHIRBRIG – DT2-7-132 task, Canada would have to renegotiate what form Canada's commitment would be for the NATO Response Force. Given the types of missions that NATO foresees using the Response Force for, it is highly likely that Canada's SOF would be a welcome addition in lieu of a mechanized battalion, which would take some time to arrive in theatre.

#### **Generate Task Forces – DT4-6-200**

Currently, this task applies to operations, which involve deployed elements other than individual augmentation. Under the "Straw-man" concept, this task would be assigned to each Joint Regional HQ.

### **TRAINING TASKS**

Training tasks are the Army Commander's direction to Land Forces Area Commanders as to what level of Collective Battle Task Standards each of their subordinate formations and units will train to and support in light of assigned operational tasks. Hence, although the training would differ for SOF, the manner of assigning the tasks to support the training would not change – each Joint Regional HQ would be assigned training tasks to perform and support based on their respective operational task load. The training task of providing an electronic

warfare element to an annual exercise would continue with 2 Electronic Warfare Squadron under the “Straw-man” model. The final training task, to plan and coordinate Army competitions, would be retained at the Army Level (see Figure 1), although the scope of the competitions would change for the Regular Force units.

## **NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRAINING TASKS**

### **Partnership for Peace and NATO Exercises**

Under the current model, each Area HQs receive tasks throughout the year aimed at providing individual augmentation or elements to various Partnership for Peace initiatives and for NATO exercises. Within the “Straw-man” construct, these tasks would simply be directed to the Joint Regional HQs.

### **Military Training Assistance Program**

For this task, each Area HQ provides individual augmentation or training cadres as required throughout the year. Under the “Straw-man” model, these tasks would be transferred to the Joint Regional HQs.

### **Small Unit Exchanges**

Small Unit Exchanges involve platoon or company-sized elements, which conduct exchange visits with other NATO Armies of a similar nature. As an example, since Canada recently procured STRYKER vehicles the emphasis for Small Unit exchanges for 2005 are with NATO countries that currently employ STRYKER vehicles as well. Under the “Straw-man” model, Small Unit Exchange tasks would be allocated to the various units to conduct exchanges with other NATO countries’ equivalents.

## **Exercise ROGUISH BUOY**

Exercise ROGUISH BUOY is an annual Army mandated dive exercise, which is used as a vehicle to exchange diver initiatives, practice large-scale diver operations and to standardize practices among the engineer units<sup>19</sup>. This task would continue to be conducted by 4 Engineer Support Regiment and the Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering. Two changes to the exercise would likely involve the inclusion of SOF personnel trained in combat diving, and the altering the focus of the exercise to be more in line with SOF type operations.

## **Conduct Area Reserve Concentrations**

Currently, each Land Forces Area is tasked to conduct Reserve training within a centralized construct known as a concentration in order to achieve regional efficiencies. This model would continue to be employed but would require a greater reliance on the Reserve Forces being more self-sufficient for training support tasks, since the Regular Force Battle Task Standards would no longer be similar under the “Straw-man” model. Some would argue the Reserve Forces are incapable of supporting their own training without the Regular Forces input, however, for the past decade, all Reserve Force engineer training has been done entirely by the Reserve Force engineer units. The engineer model could be applied to the other MOCs under the “Straw-man” model.

## **Conduct Regional Domestic Operations Training**

Each Area HQ is tasked to conduct liaison and training with civilian and governmental agencies such as civilian police forces and Emergency Preparedness Canada. This task would simply be reassigned to each Joint Regional HQ.

## **SIMULATION TRAINING TASKS**

Simulation training tasks would remain the same for the Reserve Forces. Given that simulation is not conducive for exercising SOF, it is likely that the Army would see a large reduction in associated costs for simulation exercises for the Regular Forces.

## **MISCELLANEOUS TASKS**

There are two miscellaneous tasks assigned in the *Strategic Operations and Resource Direction 2005 Draft 1*: operation of a musical band; and the provision of ceremonial guards at Parliament Hill in Ottawa and at the Citadel in Quebec City. Two options exist for these tasks: “civilianize” these tasks similar to the guards at the various historic Forts such as Fort Henry in Kingston; or transfer these tasks to the Reserve Forces.

## **ANNEX C – IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE ANALYSIS**

### **GENERAL**

This analysis will examine, at the macro level, an implementation timeline for transforming the status quo into the “Straw-man” model. After listing a number of assumptions for this annex, three aspects will be analyzed – units, individuals and timeline.

### **ASSUMPTIONS**

Joint Task Force II (JTF II), Canada’s anti-terrorism unit is currently capable of conducting all SOF tasks. JTF II can only conduct these missions for limited periods of time since they are a unit of one (albeit large for SOF), and because they lack some of the required equipment such as attack aviation. The first assumption for this analysis is that JTF II personnel would be used as the nucleus for training personnel and as leadership for the new “Straw-man” SOF battalions.

The second assumption for this analysis is that current CF and NATO Civil-Military Cooperation ((CIMIC) – in U.S. doctrine, CIMIC is referred to as Civil Affairs) training organizations are capable of training the leadership of the four proposed Civil Affairs (CA) battalions over the next 15 years.

The third assumption for this analysis is that currently trained CF personnel, augmented with additional vacancies on the U.S. Army’s PSYOP courses (over and above current levels) will be sufficient to train the leadership of the four proposed PSYOP battalions over the next 15 years.

SOF personnel are not “made” overnight, and this is especially true of the leadership. Purchase of all of the necessary SOF equipment, such as helicopters, will

require 10 or more years. It is highly unlikely that the Canadian Government will be willing to accept Canada withdrawing from all of the Nation's overseas commitments without offering something in lieu. Further, Canada's allies will require time to find a replacement for the "promised" mechanized battalions and also time to reallocate tasks more in line with the capabilities inherent in the "Straw-man" model. Therefore, the fourth and final assumption for this analysis is that the "Straw-man" model will be phased in over a period of time to be determined later in this analysis.

## **ANALYSIS**

### **Unit Training, Equipping and Standing-up New Organizations**

**SOF Battalions**. Given the "Straw-man" model would be a phased approach, in which order should units be re-rolled, trained, equipped and stood-up? Since Canada's overseas commitments call for mechanized battalions and since Canada's light infantry battalions would require the least amount of training to be integrated as SOF, the logical solution is that the light infantry units are the first to undergo SOF individual, and then collective training. Prior to conducting collective training and becoming operational, the newly formed battalions would require an influx of leadership from JTF II. Therefore, as the SOF battalions are stood-up, the JTF II would draw down.

Once the three light infantry battalions became operational, the next step would be to re-role three of the six mechanized infantry battalions. At this time, one of the two deployed operational tasks for mechanized battalions would be changed to a SOF battalion task. Once the first three re-rolled mechanized battalions are prepared to conduct collective training, there would again be an influx of leadership from JTF II and also from the previously formed SOF battalions. Once trained, the second deployed

operational task would be changed to a SOF battalion task. The process for re-rolling the mechanized infantry battalions would be repeated for the final three mechanized battalions. The SOF battalions initially formed out of the nine infantry battalions would be two thirds greater in size than the final end strength required. Once all nine infantry battalions (light and mechanized) are re-rolled and are operational, it will then be time to form the final three SOF battalions out of the existing nine battalions. It is at this point that some of the existing infrastructure will need to be renovated to house the newly formed battalion HQs and HQs companies.

**PSYOP and Civil Affairs Battalions.** For every three infantry battalions that are re-rolled to SOF battalions, one armored regiment and one combat engineer regiment would be re-rolled to PSYOP and Civil Affairs battalions, respectively. Similar to the final stages for SOF battalions, once all three PSYOP and Civil Affairs battalions are operational, the fourth battalion for each would be created out of the existing three battalions, and with augmentation from the artillery regiments (the Civil Affairs battalions are greater in size than the current combat engineer units – see Annex A).

**Independent UAV Batteries.** Currently, each artillery regiment has a trained UAV battery. As SOF battalions are stood-up, independent UAV batteries would be formed out of each of the artillery regiments. Given the size of an artillery unit, and the artillery's operational tasks, the first artillery regiment to be re-rolled would be tasked to train a second independent UAV battery.

**Transfer of Surplus PYs.** As units are re-rolled, surplus PYs would be transferred to the Air Force and Navy as applicable, to coincide with the phasing in of the



new equipment for the Air Force (attack aviation and strategic airlift squadrons) and new ships for the Navy (helicopter landing ships).

### **Individual Training**

Two problems arise when examining individual training - first, not all individuals will have the aptitude for SOF and second, time remaining before compulsory retirement age will impact training. Allowing individuals to reclassify to an occupation for which they have the aptitude best solves the first problem. Therefore, for example, some armored personnel may transfer to the SOF battalions, while some infantry transfer to a PSYOP or Civil Affairs battalion.

The second problem, regarding compulsory retirement age, has a number of solutions. One solution is to transfer the “older generation” to the units, which are the last to be re-roled, thus keeping those units operational until they are re-roled, and also to allow these personnel to serve closer to their mandatory retirement age. This solution would involve setting a mandatory retirement window to ensure costs to retrain were optimized and that sufficient personnel are available to fulfill all tasks. As an example, anyone with 10 or less years to serve would not be eligible for re-training, personnel with 10 or more years remaining would be eligible for retraining provided they had the aptitude for the training.

### **Timeline**

Taking into consideration that at least one year would be required to put in place the necessary training support infrastructure and materials to commence training, the first individual training courses would commence Year Two. Year Three involves JTF II personnel joining their new units, “sorting out” the unit, and

conducting low-level training. Year Four focuses on collective training and at least one of the three units becoming operational, with the other two following no later than six and twelve months later. Years Five to Seven repeat the process for the first three mechanized battalions, as do Years Eight to Ten for the final three mechanized infantry battalions. The final three SOF battalions, with their personnel coming from existing SOF battalions require less time and they are therefore formed, trained and operational during Years Eleven to Twelve. Taking into account delays with any of the above processes, the entire process of transforming the Army into SOF should be complete within 15 years.